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According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), the Credit Channel amplifies the 
traditional monetary transmission and this amplification effect comes 
through the firm’s external finance premium, which is a wedge between the 
expected return for the funds generated internally and the costs of funds 
raised externally to the firm. Traditionally, this wedge is the bank loan 
spread but we extend this concept to include the sovereign (country) credit 
risk and name it, Extended Credit Channel. Armed with this new concept 
and using a set up model, we estimate two econometric equations for the 
Brazilian economy after its inflation stabilization program. These two 
econometric equations measure: (1) the effects of the pure money channel 
(real interest rates and compulsory reserve requirements on demand 
deposits) and the extended credit channel (country credit risk and bank loan 
spread) on the economy’s production, and (2) the impacts of the real interest 
rates, compulsory reserve requirements on demand deposits, and country 
credit risk on the bank loan spread. Both equations coefficients signs 
conform to the expected theoretical model. With the results of the estimated 
equation (1), we define a Product Loss Index Number to compare these two 
transmission channels (extended credit and pure monetary). This 
comparison shows that the extended credit channel is as relevant as the pure 
monetary channel.  
 
Keywords: Credit Channel, Sovereign Credit Risk, Reserve Requirements 
and Bank Loan Spread. 
JEL  Classification: E44, E50, N16. 
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In his survey, Hubbard (1994) argues that “... the terms “money view” and “credit view” 
are not always well defined in theoretical debates over the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy.”  These views are also denominated as a “money view” channel and 
“credit view” channel.  
 
The traditional or “pure” money channel is defined as the transmission mechanism 
through basic interest rates and deposit reserve requirements. And, in this paper, we will 
define the credit channel according to the concept found in Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995), as a monetary transmission mechanism channel that is a companion to the 
“money” channel, particularly, the direct effects of monetary policy on interest rates that 
amplifies the borrower’s external finance premium. This borrower’s external finance 
premium is the difference between the costs of the loans interest rate and the cost of 
these funds for the lenders, namely the banks. Then, the credit channel is not seen as a 
freestanding or parallel to the money channel.  
 
Most of the emerging markets are large borrowers in the international financial system; 
hence they also face an external finance premium that is usually quoted as a spread over 
the US Treasury bonds.  
 
Before proceeding, we must address the following questions: What is the importance of 
the credit channel? And how relevant is the sovereign credit risk as a component of the 
credit channel?  
 
Thus, in this article we tackle this sovereign external finance premium by extending the 
traditional credit channel to include the country or sovereign credit risk. 
 
What lies behind this extension of the credit channel is the effect associated to a 
country’s economy when faced with adverse changes on its external finance premium. 
As it is well documented in many articles, like Hermalin and Rose (1999), Reinhart 
(2002), and Magalhães, Moreira and Rocha (2002), the deterioration of a country’s 
credit rating, which translates in an increase of its external finance premium, is not the 
cause for decline of its macroeconomic or credit conditions but it is just mirroring the 
worsening of the country’s economic risk or its economic expectations. Rigobon (2001)  5  
shows how a country’s upgrade to investment grade credit rating increases the inflow of 
foreign funds, improving the overall condition of the economy. When well managed, 
this improvement to investment grade credit rating creates a virtuous circle: increasing 
investment, the economy grows, credit rating betters up which increases the inflow of 
funds and so on.      
 
Therefore, the motivation for this paper is to answer the following set of questions:  
(Q1)  What are the magnitude of the effects on income derived from this difference 
between the funds cost of the financial intermediaries, namely the banks, and the cost of 
the loans to borrowers?     
(Q2)  How relevant is sovereign credit risk premium effect on the credit channel and on 
the economic activity? 
 
Our theoretical model is based on the economic model presented in Chu and Nakane 
(2001), which was built on the loan interest-rate clearing-price framework fashioned by 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988). And it was adapted to suit for a variable representing the 
difference between the banks’ loans interest rate and the cost of these resources, 
namely, the bank loan spread. 
 
The first empirical equation was based on a cointegration model with an error correction 
term, and estimated the relationship between the real income (using the Industrial 
Production Index as a proxy) and the components of the pure money channel (legal 
reserves on demand deposits and real interest rates) and the extended credit channel 
(bank loans spread and sovereign country credit risk) for Brazil after its Inflation 
Stabilization Program in July 1994. 
  
Our second empirical equation, also based on a cointegration model with an error 
correction term, searches for a relation between the bank loan spread and those other 
components of the monetary transmission, namely, the legal reserves, interest rates and 
country credit risk.  
 
After estimating these two equations, we calculate the sensibility of the dependent 
variables to changes in the explanatory variables. We create a Product Loss Index to  6  
compare the impact of the pure money channel and the extended credit channel, which 
results that the effects of the extended credit channel can be as relevant as the pure 
money channel. 
 
The paper is divided in four parts. First, we make a short description of the model found 
in Chu and Nakane (2000) and adapt it for the bank loans spread. Second part describes 
the data for Brazil used for the empirical test. In the third part, we present the 
econometric model and the estimated equations and discuss the results. Finally, the last 
part is the conclusion. 
 
 
1. The  Model 
 
In this section we will make a short description of the theoretical model presented in 
Chu and Nakane (2001). 
  
The main hypotheses concerning this economy with four agents: banks, government, 
households and firms are:  
 
H1)  The monetary authority follows an inflation-targeting regime and determines 
two policy instruments: a short-term nominal interest rate and the required reserve ratio 
on demand deposits (α). In the short-term and under inflation targeting regime, there is 
no uncertainty about the inflation, therefore the monetary authority can control the real 
interest rate rB = 
_
B r , where 
_
B r  is the real interest rate on public bonds. These two policy 
instruments are assumed to be exogenous in the model.  And the supply of public bonds 
B
g is infinitely elastic at the real interest rate 
_
B r . 
 
H2)  Let S (y, rB) be the households real savings and y the real income. The partial 
derivatives are  0 > y S and  0 >
B r S .  
 
H3)  Firms finance their investments I (rB, rL) through bank loans that cost the loan 
interest rate rL, where  0 <
B r I  and  0 <
L r I . And I (rB, rL) = S (y, rB). The variable banking  7  
loan spread (γ) represents the difference between banking loan interest rate and the basic 
interest rate paid by the public bonds.  
 
H4)  Banks’ have only demand deposits, no capital and hold three assets:  legal 
reserve requirements on demand deposits (R), public bonds (B
b) and loans (L
b). Bank’s 
balance sheet will be equal to: 
 






b is banks’ total deposits. It is assumed that the banks accept passively all the 
deposits demanded by the non-bank public. And the non-banks public deposits demand 
function is D
d(y, rB) with 0 >
d
y D and  0 <
d
rB D  as its partial derivatives. The banks do not 
pay interest for the demand deposits that are subject to legal reserve requirements and 
they do not carry excess reserves beyond the minimum established by the monetary 
authority.   
 




b(σ, rL), where σ is variable that represents the economy’s risk. The assumption 
for its partial derivatives is  0 >
b Bσ and  0 <
b
rL B . It is assumed that the demand for 
public bonds is totally inelastic with respect to its own interest rate. 
 
Applying B
b(σ, rL) in equation (1) and substituting for (2) we will have the following 
banks’ supply of loans function: 
 
(3) L




The non-bank public’s demand for bank loans is denoted by L
d(rL, y) with partial 
derivatives  0 <
d
rL L and  0 >
d
y L . 
 
With these assumptions, the market clearing condition for the goods market corresponds 
to the IS schedule with a negative slope in the (rL, y) plan:  8  
 











The market clearing conditions for the deposits and bank loans represented in a single 
schedule is made by using equation (3) with D
b = D
d(y, rB) and L
b = L
d (rL, y),  then, 
 
(5) (1-  α)D
d(y, rB) - B
b(σ, rL) = L
d(rL, y) 
 
Equation (5) provides the set of (rL, y) that assures the simultaneous equilibrium in the 
deposit and loan markets represented by the schedule DL. This DL schedule can have a 
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The sign uncertainty comes from the numerator’s unknown sign result, but in any event, 
the DL slope is assumed to be greater than the IS slope.   
 
The economy’s general equilibrium is represented in Figure 1. With a positive slope for 
DL and rL
* and y
*, represent, respectively, the equilibrium values for rL and y. 
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Figure 1: The Economy’s General Equilibrium.  9  
 
The model’s exogenous variables are α, r
*
B, and σ. Table 1 summarizes the comparative 
static results for the model
1. 





α  - + 
_
B r  
- ? 
σ  - + 
 
Table 1: Comparative Static and 
_
B r  is the basic real interest rate. 
 
After this brief description of Chu and Nakane (2001), we will adapt their model for the 




L – rB , by replacing r
*
L for (γ
* + rB) and deriving the 




In Table 2, we present these results. And in the Appendix, it is shown the mathematical 






α  - + 
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B r  
- ? 
σ  - + 
 





B r  is the basic real interest rate. 
 
The signs of derivatives related to the spread (γ
*) are intuitive: 
An increase in α results in additional compulsory reserve requirements for demand 
deposits, meaning that the banks will have a lower volume of money for lending 
purposes, therefore we will have a higher γ
*. And an opposite situation happens when α 
                                                 
1 The proofs of the results presented in Table 1 appear in the Appendix of Chu and Nakane (2001).  10  
decreases, with a larger volume of funds resulting in a lower γ
*. Figure 2 shows 
graphically the effects of an increase of α.          
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Lowering the economy-wide risk σ leads the banks to reduce their demand for public 
bonds freeing resources for loans, this will move the DL curve to the right, resulting in 
an opposite situation from Figure 2. This effect is shown graphically in Figure 3.     
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Increases in the variables α, 
_
B r  and σ result in a shift of the DL schedule to the left or 
upward that lower the y





  11  
2.   The Data 
 
We made an empirical test with the data from the Brazilian economy. Our test sample 
starts in August/1994 and goes till September/2001, consisting of 86 monthly 
observations. The Brazilian hyperinflation stabilization plan started in July/1994, then 
we choose August/1994 as starting month, because there were some inflation residuals 
contaminating the July inflation index. These data contain the following variables: 
 
Country Credit Risk (Risk)– it consists of the monthly geometric average price of the 
Brazilian foreign debt (C-Bond) and is measured as annual spread over the U.S. 
Treasury Bonds. This spread measures the country credit risk or, in other words, the 
Brazilian sovereign credit risk. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root was 
performed and could not reject that the series is integrated of order one, I(1). 
 
Spread (S)– it is the banking loan monthly spread published in the monthly and annual 
report
2 produced by the Brazilian Central Bank. It is basically a weighted average of 
fixed loans and credit instruments offered by the main private banks in Brazil. The unit 
root tests indicated that this series is I(1). 
 
Real Interest Rates plus one (1+rB) – where rB is the geometric average monthly basic 
interest rate of the economy determined by the Brazilian Central Bank SELIC (i) 
divided by the General Price Index (IGP-DI) published by FGV. The unit root test 
rejected at 5% significance, meaning that the series is stationary at series level, I(0).  
 
Product (Y) – it is represented by the monthly Industrial Production Index collected by 
IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) and it was seasonally adjusted 
by the multiplicative X-11 methodology. Applying the unit root tests resulted that the 
series is integrated of order one, I(1).   
 
Compulsory Reserve Requirements (α) – it is the legal reserve requirement for the 
banks’ demand deposits. These are the reserves, as a percentage of demand deposits that  12  
the banks are obliged to deposit at the monetary authority. Unit root tests indicated that 
the series is integrated of order one, I(1).  
 
Figure 4 presents a graphic with the Risk (C-Bond as % a.y. spread over the U.S. 
Treasury Bonds) and the behavior of the Industrial Production Index Seasonally 
Adjusted. It is possible to see that the valleys of the C-Bond are accompanied by an 
increase of the Industrial Production, suggesting a negative relationship between these 
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Figure 4: Dotted Line - Risk % a.y. over Treasury    
Bold Line - Industrial Production Season Adjusted. 
 
Figure 5 is a graphic of the Loan Spread (% a.m.) versus the Compulsory Reserve 
Requirements as a percentage of Total Demand Deposits. It can be seen that the drop of 
the legal reserve requirements is accompanied by a reduction of the loan spread. 
                                                                                                                                               
2 Banco Central do Brasil,  “Notas dos Juros e Spread Bancário no Brasil” (monthly report) and “Juros e 
Spread Bancário no Brasil” (report for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001). These reports also describe the 
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Figure 5: Dotted Line - % Compulsory Reserve     
Bold Line - Loan Spread % a.m. 
 
3.   Empirical Model 
3.1.   Empirical Model for the Product (Y) 
  
From Table 2, the empirical model for the dependent variable product Y, which has the 
Industrial Production Index Seasonally Adjusted as its proxy, is explained using the 
explanatory variables from Table 2: compulsory reserve requirements (α), real interest 
plus one (1+ rB) and (risk) measured by the Brazilian sovereign credit risk (C-Bond); 
with an additional varaible: bank loan spread (S).  
 
The Johansen test was performed up to 12 lags for a group of these 5 variables and co-
integration could not be rejected for at least 3 co-integration vectors.  
 
The presence of co-integration resulted in the necessity of an Error Correction Term 
(ECTY) for our econometric model. The specification of ECTY
3 is: 
 
                                                 
3 The econometric program that we used did not provide the standard deviation for the coefficients of the 
deterministic trend (*) and the intercept (**).  14  
81037 . 5 002053 . 0 015774 . 0 ln 348324 . 0 ) 1 ln( 62011 . 11 ln 077083 . 0 ln − − − − + + + = Trend t t S t B r t Risk t Y t ECTY α
  (0.01589)     (1.39767)           (0.07020)       (0.01866)      (*)            (**) 
 
Where the term Trend represents a linear trend variable.  
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The econometric test was performed assuming all variables as I(1), including the 
variable real interest rate plus one (1+ rB). The difference operator for the variables 
logarithm is represented by the ∆ operator.  
 
The estimation of the coefficients of the econometric equation for the product Y, 
represented by Industrial Production Index Seasonally Adjusted, is shown in Table 4 
below. The sign for the sum of the coefficients for each variable accords to the 
prediction of our theoretic model. The discussion of these results are presented in the 
following sub-section 3.3.  
 
Table 4: Estimated Econometric Equation for Product Y 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆lnYt 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic 
∆lnYt-1  -0.437323  0.086003  -5.084998 
∆lnYt-4  -0.149864  0.085990  -1.742821 
∆lnRiskt  -0.067580  0.023288  -2.901918 
∆ln(1+ rB)t-2   0.735783  0.263039  2.797237 
∆ln(1+ rB)t-9   -0.735944  0.248503  -2.961508 
∆ln(1+ rB)t-12   -0.548211  0.238608  -2.297537 
∆lnSpreadt-1  -0.120808  0.054495  -2.216851 
∆lnαt  0.145041  0.077130  1.880482 
∆lnαt-8  -0.167872  0.076972  -2.180958 
ECTYt-1  -0.070964  0.024932  -2.846265 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.491663        Durbin-Watson stat: 2.190872 
 
 
Our tests did not reject normality (Jarque-Bera), homocedasticity (Arch(1) and White) 
and residuals are not correlated.    
  15  
3.2.   Empirical Model for the Spread (S) 
 
The empirical model for the dependent variable Spread (S), which is a monthly rate, 
consisted of three variables: compulsory reserve requirements (α), real interest plus one 
(1+ rB) and MRisk, which is a conversion of C-Bonds annual spread over U.S. Treasury 
Bonds to monthly spread over U.S. Treasury Bonds. Equation (8) shows mathematically 




) 1 ( Risk MRisk + =  
 
We performed the Johansen test up to the 12 lags for a set of these 4 variables and co-
integration could not be rejected for at least 2 co-integration vectors.  
 
The existence of co-integration produced the need of an Error Correction Term (ECTS) 
for our econometric model. The specification of ECTS is: 
 
218101 . 0 60048 . 0 ) 1 ln( 43029 . 17 ln 693660 . 0 ln − − + − − = t t B t t t r MRisk Spread ECTS α   
            (0.11199)         (3.29866)        (0.14303) 
 
Except for ln(1 + rB) which is I(0), those other 3 variables, Spread (S), compulsory 
reserve requirements (α) and monthly risk rates (MRisk) are all I(1). And the difference 
operator for the variables logarithm is represented by the ∆ operator.  
 
The econometric model for the Spread was: 
(9)
1 00
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Our final estimation for the coefficients of the econometric equation for the Spread is 
shown in Table 5. 
   16  
 
Table 5: Estimated Econometric Equation for the Spread 
 
Dependent Variable: Spread 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic 
Constant 0.024429  0.010781  2.266037 
∆lnSpreadt-2  0.236747  0.094574  2.503298 
∆lnSpreadt-3  -0.160601  0.099413  -1.615494 
∆lnSpreadt-4  -0.266109  0.099319  -2.679329 
∆lnSpreadt-7  -0.176287  0.094000  -1.875400 
∆lnSpreadt-11  -0.231517  0.083909  -2.759128 
∆lnMRiskt-8   0.115184  0.043782  2.630857 
∆lnαt   0.339996  0.157733  2.155515 
∆lnαt-5   0.451151  0.146564  3.078177 
∆lnαt-6   0.318329  0.145719  2.184548 
∆ln(1+ rB)t  2.200057  0.555877  3.957810 
∆ln(1+ rB)t-1  -1.444039  0.729013  -1.980814 
∆ln(1+ rB)t-2  -1.100265  0.621179  -1.771252 
∆ln(1+ rB)t-3  2.261766  0.593387  3.811619 
∆ln(1+ rB)t-5  -0.969302  0.506735  -1.912838 
∆ln(1+ rB)t-7  1.123173  0.593310  1.893061 
∆ln(1+ rB)t-8  -2.725414  0.555900  -4.902705 
∆ln(1+ rB)t-12  -1.250886  0.486525  -2.571063 
ECTSt-1 -0.062721  0.025932  -2.418649 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.454738         Durbin-Watson stat: 2.272964 
 
 
The performed tests for normality (Jarque-Bera), homocedasticity (Arch(1) and White) 
were not rejected and residuals are not correlated.  
 
Also, the Wald test with the null hypothesis for the sum of coefficients of ∆ln(1+ rB) = 0 
resulted in its rejection at 1% significance, as presented in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Wald test results for the sum of the coefficients of  ∆ln(1+ rB). 
 
Wald Test: 
Null Hypothesis:  C(11)+C(12)+C(13)+C(14)+C(15)+C(16)+C(17)+C(18)=0 
F-statistic 7.536553 Probability 0.008152 




3.3   Discussion of the Results 
 
Our empirical results for the Brazilian economy are in accordance with what’s predicted 
by the Chu and Nakane’s (2001) theoretical model. And a sensibility analysis for a 
medium term economic horizon is presented in Tables 7 and 8, respectively, for the 
estimated Product Equation and Bank Loan Spread Equation.   17  
 
(1) The product Y equation  
The coefficients signs are: negative for Risk (CBond), negative for real interest rate, 
negative for the bank loan spread and negative for α - compulsory reserve requirements 
for demand deposits.  
 
Table 7: Sensibility analysis for the coefficients of the Estimated Product Equation. 
 
Industrial Production Index: annual rate rounded to second decimal {(Yt/Yt-1)-1}
Risk  Increase of 10% of Risk  -40 b.p.
(1+ rB)
4  Increase of 10% of rB(t) with rB(t-1) = 8% a.y, depends on level of rB(t-1)    -25 b.p.
Spread
  A 10% Spread Increase.    -72 b.p.
α  Increase of 10% compulsory reserve requirement.  -14 b.p.
b.p. = basis point 
 
 
Since the range of our risk (C-Bond) as spread over the Treasury is between 600 b.p. to 
1,000 b.p. then a 10% increase in risk, representing an additional of 60 b.p. to 100 b.p., 
translates into an estimated drop of – 40 b.p. in the year product.   
 
The effects of the real interest rate is approximate, because our variable is (1+ rB) and 
not only rB, hence, at the level of rB = 8% a.y. which corresponds to a value of 1+ rB (= 
1.08) and 10% of it amounts nearly 100 b.p. a year, resulting in an estimated loss of -25 
b.p. over the country’s yearly production.  
 
Since the bank loan spread is very high in Brazil, a 10% increase on the loan spread 
equals an addition of a number within the range of 350 b.p. to 750 b.p., which will have 
an estimated negative impact of –72 b.p. on the year’s production. And for α, the 
compulsory reserve requirement on demand deposits, its effects is smaller, in the 
present case of α = 45% of the demand deposits, a 10% increase equals an addition of 
450 b.p. resulting in an estimated negative impact on the yearly production of –14 b.p. 
 
                                                 
4 The result is approximate since to find the ln((1+Xt/(1+Xt-1)) in the case of real interest rates depends on 
the exact number of Xt and Xt-1.   18  
In summary, we can see that the variable that has the largest negative impact on the 
Industrial Production Index is the Sovereign Credit Risk (C-Bond), which for a 10% 
increase in the sovereign risk (with the risk on the range of 600 b.p. to 1,000 b.p. over 




Defining PLIN as Product Loss Index Number
6, this index number represents how 
many basis points of yearly production loss for each basis point change of the 
explanatory variable. Thus, after the sovereign credit risk, the real interest rate (at the 
initial interest rate in the neighborhood of 8 % a year) will have a negative impact of –
0.25 on PLIN and the bank loan spread, for the spread at 34.495% a year, will result in a 
product loss index number of  -0.2087. And the smallest impact on PLIN for a 10% 
increase in the variable is related to the compulsory reserve requirement, at today’s 
value of α = 45% to α = 49.5% of the demand deposits, this will produce a negative 
change of -0.03111 to the production loss index number.  Table 8 summarizes all the 
impacts on the product loss index number (PLIN) for an adverse change in the 
macroeconomic variable. 
 
Table 8: Variables impact on the product in terms of a loss index number. 
 
Product Loss Index Number: Estimated Product Loss Index Range 
Increase of 10% of Risk (Country Credit Risk) range: 60 to 100 b.p.  -0.66667  -0.40 
Increase of 10% of Rb(t), with initial Rb(t-1) = 8% a.y. (Variations depend on 
initial Rbt-1) 
-0.25  -0.25 
Increase of 10%, for annual spread (initial spread of 34.49%)  -0.2087  -0.2087 
Increase of 10% for α (compulsory reserve requirement) initial α(t-1) = 45%  -0.03111  -0.03111 
 
 
Table 9 below compares the sum of the product loss index number for those two 
channels of transmission: Extended Credit Channel (with the variables: Country Credit 
Risk and Bank Loan Spread) and Pure Monetary Channel (with the variables: real 
interest rates and compulsory reserve requirements). It can be seen that the extended 
credit channel affects sensitively on the yearly production. Since the overall impact 
                                                 
5 The division of the loss in b.p. per 10% change of the variable in b.p. generates a loss index number, for 
instance, (-40 b.p./60b.p.) equals –0.666 for the upper limit of the risk variable impact.  
6 The Product Loss Index sign is negative because in the coefficients signs of the econometric equation 
are negative.   19  
depends on the initial state, we can say, at the very least, that the Extended Credit 
Channel affects the economy as much as the pure monetary channel.   
 
Table 9: Comparing the effects of Extended Credit Channel  
and Pure Monetary Channel 
 
Sum Of Product Loss Index Number:  Estimated Range Extracted from Tables 7 and 8 
Extended Credit Channel effects (Country Credit Risk and Bank Loan Spread)  -0.87537  -0.6087 
Pure Monetary Channel effects (real interest rates and compulsory reserve 
requirements) 
-0.28111  -0.28111 
 
 
(2) The bank loan spread (S) equation 
The coefficients signs are: positive for Risk (CBond), positive for real interest rate and 
positive for α - compulsory reserve requirements for demand deposit.  
 
Table 10: Sensibility analyses for the coefficients of the  
Estimated Loan Spread Equation 
 
Spreadt – Spreadt-1, where Spreadt-1= 34.49% a.y, and rounded to second decimal
Risk  Increase of 10% of Risk (C-Bond)  77 b.p.
(1+ rB)
  Increase of 10% of rB(t) with rB(t-1) = 8% a.y, depends on level of rB(t-1)    57 b.p.
α  Increase of 10% compulsory reserve requirement  293 b.p.
b.p. = basis point 
 
Repeating the same analysis for the bank loan spread within the same 10% range 
increase assumed for those explanatory variables in the product equation described 
above, and from a initial bank loan spread of 34.49% a year, we get the following 
results: 
 
For a range of 60 b.p. to 100 b.p. addition limits to the risk (C-Bond) variable at the 
annual rate, we will have an estimated annual spread increase of 77b.p. 
 
The additional real interest rate, considering that the actual variable is (1 + rB) and the 
initial rB is 8% a year, is 57 b.p. for the annual rate.   
 
Of these three variables (risk, real interest rate and reserve requirements), the largest 
impact on the bank loan spread comes from the legal reserve requirements. An 
additional 10% of the compulsory reserve requirements on demand deposits (α), which  20  
at present moment stands at 45% rate, resulting in a new α of 49.5% rate will increase 





This paper is a follow-up of a theoretic model contained in Chu and Nakane (2001) and 
makes an empirical test based on that theoretical model. The monetary authority has 
control over two policy instruments: short term real interest rate and the compulsory 
reserve requirements for the demand deposits. More specifically, we cover empirically 
the effects of transmission to the bank loans called credit channel and, extend it to 
include the sovereign country credit risk measured, using C-Bonds, as a spread over the 
US Treasury bonds.  
 
The impact on the Brazilian economy of this extended credit channel, which is the sum 
of the effects of the bank loans spread and the sovereign credit risk (as a proxy for an 
economy-wide risk) can be as relevant as the pure money channel (interest rates and 
legal reserve requirements).  
 
Hence, in determining the effects of the credit channel for emerging countries 
economies it is important to include a parameter that indicates the expected risk of the 





The results from the Appendix of Chu and Nakane (2001) are presented and they will be 
used to generate new equations for the spread γ
* variable.  
 
Given the two equations represented by the IS and DL  
 
 I(rB, rL) = S(y, rB) 
 
(1- α)D
d(y, rB) - B
b(σ, rL) = L
d(rL, y) 
 
Let ∆ the system’s Jacobian determinant solved at the equilibrium, which is equal to: 
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(10)   r*L= rB + γ
*  
 
And by equation (10), assuming that 
α d
drB = 0, and substituting and deriving the 
equations below, comes: 
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1.2 Variations in 
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* α α γ ≷ 0 
 
 As  rB = 
_
B r + Γ, where Γ is inflation and 
_
B r d
dΓ <0, an increase in the real interest 
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As assumed in our initial hypothesis that rB is determined exogenously by the monetary 
authority under an inflation targeting framework and σ  is a measure of the economy-
wide risk, therefore these two assumptions lead to the hypothesis that 
σ d
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